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COMMENTS
THE BLAISDELL DECISION-ONE YEAR AFTE.-One year ago this month,
the United States Supreme Court, in the Blaisdell decision,' sustained the con-
stitutionality of the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law.2  In committing
itself relative to the validity of this statute, the Court revealed to some extent
its temper in regard to emergency legislation. The appearance of the decision
at a time when the validity of federal and state interference with private
rights was seriously questioned, accentuated its importance. What has been
the effect of this decision on the state courts? A proper answer to this question
necessitates a preliminary survey of the historical background and a brief anal-
ysis of the case itself.
Moratoria Prior to the Blaisdell Decision
The financial stringencies occasioned by the Revolutionary War were pro-
ductive of a hostile debtor class who insisted upon relief from their economic
embarrassments.3 Their demands found articulation in the form of legal
tender acts and moratoria, or "stay" laws, enacted by the states in the pre-
constitutional era.4 The wisdom of this legislative action in delaying the
enforcement of and modifying existing obligations, created an issue which
1. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 88 A. L. 1.. 1519 (1934).
The decision has been thoroughly treated in many of the law reviews but there is a conflict
concerning its exact holding. See Prosser, The Minnesota Moratorium (1934) 7 So. CAUF.
L. REy. 353 (nothing very revolutionary has occurred-a strict adherence to the require-
ments of the decision is necessary for validity); Heffernan, The Minnesota Moratorium
Case (1934) 9 Iwo. L. 3. 337 (an unmistakable development in the flexibility of the
contract clause); Jeffers, The Texas Moratorium Law (1934) 12 Ta. L. REv. 383 (the
court conceded that the obligations of contracts may be impaired); Corwin, Moratorium
Over Minnesota (1934) 82 U. or PA. L. REv. 311 (Constitution interpreted as if adopted
today).
2. Mlinn. Laws 1933, c. 339, popularly called the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium
Law, granting the court the power to extend the redemption period in mortgages. See
notes 36, 56, infra for a list of mortgage emergency statutes passed in many of the states.
3. See McAsLra, HiTORY OF TE PEOPLE OF THE UnITED SrTAMs (1927) 304-339;
WAPan, TnE MAEING OF THE CoNsrrunoN (1928) 5-6; S Uuisn LIFE or GEOn 
WAsI Goo (1850) 85-88.
4. See Johnson v. Duncan, 3 Mart. 530, 540 (La. 1815). "The charter of our Federal
rights was framed not many years after the termination of the war which secured our
independence. The disasters, attending the arduous conflict, had disabled many an honest
individual from punctually discharging his obligations; and the Legislature of some of the
states, more attentive to afford immediate and temporary relief, than a more remote and last-
ing one, by a sacred regard for good faith-passed laws, meliorating the conditions of debtors
to the injury and ruin of creditors:' For a history of the debates in the Constitutional
Convention, see Feller, Moratory Legislation: A Comparative Study (1933) 46 Hanv. L.
REV. 1061, 1067-68.
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split the country into two distinct political parties.5 Permanent evidence of
the triumph of the party which insisted on a strict enforcement of existing obli-
gations was written into the Constitution by the adoption of the clause "No
State shall .. pass any . . law impairing the obligation of contracts."
Subsequent critical economic periods1 were productive of moratoria and
emergency legislation s similar to that enacted by the states prior to the adoption
of the Constitution. The majority of the state courts, faced with the constitu-
tional prohibition and the history of its adoption, nullified the efforts of the
legislatures by holding these statutes invalid as impairing the obligation of
contracts.9 The United States Supreme Court likewise stamped the stigma
of unconstitutionality upon this legislation.10 During the present depression
and prior to the Blaisdell decision, history was but repeating itself. Many
of the states enacted various types of mortgage emergency legislation which
either stayed foreclosure proceedings" or granted to the courts the power of
extending the period of redemption,' 2 or of fixing an upset price in such pro-
ceedings,1 3 or of refusing to confirm the foreclosure sale where the price was
inadequate.14 The majority of the state courts kept intact the historic trilogy-
S. "The discontents'and uneasiness, arising in a great measure from the embarrassments
in which a considerable number of individuals were involved, continued to become more
extensive. At length, two great parties were formed in every state, which were distinctly
marked, and which pursued distinct objects, with systematic arrangement." 5 MARSUALt,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 85.
6. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 10. See Townsend v. Townsend, 1 Peck 1, 1-2 (Tenn, 1821);
State v. Carew, 13 Rich. L. 498, 521-23 (S. C. 1866).
7. Depressions have been periodic: period following the War of 1812; panic of 1837;
Civil War crisis; 1873; 1893; 1907; period after the World War and the present depression.
A concomitant of these crises has been moratoria' relief.
8. See Feller, supra note 4, at 1081-1085 for a collection of these statutes.
9. See RosE's NoTEs ox U. S. REPoRTs (Rev. Ed. 1917) 1195 et seq. for a compilation
of over a hundred cases relative to these early moratoria laws.
10. Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U. S. 310 (1843) (statute affecting mortgagee's foreclosure
rights); McCracken v. Hayward, 43 U. S. 607 (1844); Gantly's Lessee v. Ewing, 44 U. S.
707 (1845) (statute providing no real property to be sold for less than one-half its appraised
valuation); Howard v. Bugbee, 65 U. S. 461 (1860) (redemption period extended for two
years); Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595 (1877); Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118
(1896) (statute authorized redemption eighteen months after foreclosure, there being no
such right at the time of contract); see Harrison v. Remington Paper Co., 140 Fed. 385,
391-92 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905) for a discussion of these decisions and a collection of the
United States Supreme Court cases relative to the question of impairment of the obligation
of contracts by the states. Cf. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (1921); Marcus Brown
Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170 (1921); Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258
U. S. 242 (1922). These decisions known as the "rent cases" were sustained because of an
emergency, but it was of the nature of a war-time rather than a peace-time emergency.
11. See note 36, infra.
12. See note 36, infra.
13. See note 56, infra.
14. See note 56, infra.
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economic crises, moratoria and judicial declarations of unconstitutionality'
Some courts, however, feeling that legislative relief was necessary to cope with
the serious conditions attendant upon the present depression,'0 upheld the
validity of the statutes enacted in their jurisdictions.' 7
15. Emergency statutes were declared unconstitutional in the following cases: Adams
v. Spilyards, 187 Ark. 641, 61 S. W. (2d) 686 (1933) (statute prohibited deficiency
judgments and authorized courts to refuse confirmation unless price adequate); Vanderbilt
v. Brunton Piano Co., 111 N. J. L. 596, 169 A. 177 (1933) (court authorized to fix
upset price); State ex rel. Cleveringa v. Klein, 63 N. D. 514, 249 N. W. 118 (1933)
(two year extension of period of redemption); Murphy v. Phillips, 63 S. W. (2d) 404
(Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Sanders, 62 S. W. (2d) 348 (Te. Civ.
App. 1933) (all actions for the recovery of real property on the enforcement of a lien
therein stayed for 180 days); Milkint v. McNeeley, 113 W. Va. 812, 169 S. E. 790 (1933)
(statute extended the period of redemption of property sold for taxes); cf. Alliance Trust
Co. v. Hall, 5 F. Supp. 285 (S. D. Idaho 1933) (proclamation of governor suspending
foreclosures unconstitutional assumption of legislative power); State cx red. Lichtscheidl v.
Moeller, 187 Minn. 397, 249 N. W. 330 (1933) (order by governor adjourning foreclosure
sales unconstitutional assumption of legislative power).
16. Indiscriminate foreclosures precipitated conditions which at times were critical.
See (1933) 61 BnAnsmRavrs WEi=.v 321 for figures indicating the growing increase of
farm foreclosures in 1933. For a description of the disorders caused by these foreclosures
see N. Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1933, at 10; id. Jan. 29, 1933, § 2 at 2. See Blaisdell v. Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 189 Minn. 422, 425, 249 N. W. 334, 337 (1933); Comment (1933) 1
GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 500; see U. S. Daily, Jan. 11, 1932, at 875 showing that farm mortgage
indebtedness amounted to over nine billion dollars.
17. State ex rel. Dowling v. Butts, 111 Fla. 630, 149 So. 746 (1933); Blaisdell v. Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 139 Minn. 422, 249 N. W. 334 (1933) (admitting the obligation is im-
paired); McCarty v. Prudence-Bonds Corp., 149 Misc. 13, 266 N. Y. Supp. 629 (Sup. Ct.
1933); Lingo Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 64 S. W. (2d) 835 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Beaumont
Petroleum Syndicate v. Broussard, 64 S. W. (2d) 993 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). In an attempt
to relax the rigidity of the contract clause, Marshall, C. J., in a dictum in Sturges v.
Crowinshield, 17 U. S. 120, 200 (1819) suggested that there is a distinction between the
remedy on, and the obligation of, contracts. This suggestion was immediately qualified in
Green v. Biddle, 21 U. S. 1 (1823) holding that if the statutes so changed the remedy as
to impair the rights and interests of the owner, they are a violation of the Constitution.
However, a state may interfere with the remedies on the contract provided a substantial
remedy is left to enforce the obligation, see note 52, infra. The legislatures have not been
alone in their attempts to aid the mortgagor. See Suring State Bank v. Giese, 210 Wis.
4S9, 492-493, 246 N. W. 556, 557-558 (1933) wherein the court suggested that equity
courts had the power to fix an upset price and to refuse to confirm a foreclosure CAe
where the price was inadequate. The New Jersey court in Federal Title & Mortgage
Guaranty Co. v. Lowenstein, 113 N. J. Eq. 200, 166 At. 538 (Ch. 1933) refused to confirm
unless the mortgagee assented to the crediting on the bond the fair value of the premises.
And in Farmers & Mechanics Bank v. Eagle Bldg. Co., 151 Misc. 249, 271 N. Y. Supp.
306 (Sup. Ct. 1934) the court fixed an upset price at which the property must be bought.
Contra: Mellon v. Edwards, Wash. Sup. Ct. No. 25091, U. S. L. Week, Dec. 11, 1934, at
13 (court has no power to fix upset price). And in Kenly v. Huntingdon Bldg. Ass'n, 170
At. 526 (Md. 1934) the court held inadequacy of price does not justify the setting aside of
a foreclosure sale. Accord: Southern Grocery Co. v. Merchants Title & Inv. Co., 186 Ark.
615, 54 S. W. (2d) 980 (1932); Lipscomb v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 138 Mo. 17, 39 S. W. 465
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The Blaisdell Decision
In the Blaisdell decision, the United States Supreme Court held constitutional
the Minnesota statute which granted to the courts the power of extending the
redemption period from foreclosure sales. While the Court indicated that the
existence of an economic emergency 18 justified this exercise of the. reserved
power of the state, it held that to dissipate the prohibition in the contract
clause, the exercise must be reasonable'0 in view of the circumstances occasion-
ing its exercise and considering the rights of the mortgagee. In distinguishing
the earlier decisionsY20 the court relied on the fact that the present statute pro.
vided that the rental value of the mortgaged premises be applied to the carry-
ing of the property and the diminution of the existing indebtedness. 21 The
majority opinion insisted that the Constitution is not to be interpreted with
literal exactness, 22 and their decision was predicated on the broad premise that
there has been "a growing appreciation of public needs and of the necessity
of finding ground for a rational compromise between individual rights and
public welfare. "23  The- dissenting opinion proceeded on the theory that "the
Constitution is a written instrument. As such its meaning does not alter.
That which it meant when adopted it means now." 24  Of interest, at this time,
is the interpretation of the decision by the state courts when dealing with
emergency legislation.
Interpretation of the Blaisdell Decision by State Courts
Since the Blaisdell decision, eleven courts have passed upon the constitu-
tionality of emergency legislation.r Eight statutes have been confirmed as
(1897); Judah v. Pitts, 333 Mo. 301, 62 S. V. (2d) 715 (1933); Lincoln Deposit Co. v.
Carlson, 125 Neb. 361, 250 N. W. 236 (1933); John Paul Lumber Co. v. Neumeister, 106
Wis. 243, 82 N. W. 144 (1900). See Ballentyne v. Smith, 205 U. S. 285, 290 (1907)
(equity court has no inherent power to set aside a foreclosure sale for mere inadequacy of
price unless so gross as to shock the conscience of equity).
18. The court took judicial notice of the fact that the mortgages were held by insurance
companies, banks, and investment companies and maintained that the legislature sought
to prevent the impending ruin of both the mortgagor and the mortgagee. Home Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, at 445-46 (1934).
19. The elements which constituted the reasonableness of the provisions of the statute
were the retention of a security, the definite time limit and the compensatory provislon
contained therein. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, at 444-45-46
(1934).
20. See note 10, supra.
21. The court compared the Minnesota statute to the statute held unconstitutional In
Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U. S. 310 (1843), and declared that the earlier statute made no
provision for the payment of the rental value to pay taxes and the interest on the mortgage
debt. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 431, 432 (1934).
22. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 428 (1934). The
concept of the Constitution as being susceptible of flexibility has been expressed by many
authorities. BmETLY, Tim PROcESS or GovRiim (1908); BEm, AMmucAN Govtm'-
MaNT & PotaTncs (1910); MAcBAnw, Tha LIvinG CoNsTiUTrox (1927).
23. See Home Bldg. &.Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 442 (1934).
24. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, at 450 (1934).
25. See note 37 et seq., infra.
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constitutional,20 and the courts in sustaining these, have relied on the Blais-
dell decision to overcome any constitutional objections. This reliance has
an important significance when it is considered that many of the statutes
were dissimilar to the Minnesota act. Diverse and varied problems have
been presented to the courts by these eleven statutes: provisions for the
extension of the redemption period by the courts;2 T the staying of foreclosures; -2
the granting to the courts of the power of refusing to confirm the foreclosure
sale because of the inadequacy of price;20 the delaying of a suit against the
custodian of public funds; 30 the modification of remedies relative to actions
against delinquent taxpayers; 3 ' the staying of the power of the bondholder
to sue on the bond; 32 and enactments relative to the liquidation and rehabilita-
tion of insolvent banks and mortgage companies.3 3 These statutes typify the
various emergency acts which called for the application of the principles set
forth in the Blaisdell Case.
Mortgage Emergency Legislation
The Michigan,34 Iowa35 and Texas 0 statutes provided for substantially the
same relief as the Minnesota statute which was held constitutional by the
Supreme Court. The Iowa statute provided that on application of the mort-
gagor the court was empowered to extend the redemption period, while the
Texas and Michigan statutes authorized the courts to stay foreclosure pro-
ceedings. All three recited the existence of an emergency and their operation
26. See notes 37, 38, 57, 65, 73, 81, 85, 86, infra.
27. Iowa Acts 45th Gen. Assem., c. 179.
28. Md. Acts Spec. Sess. 1933, cc. 56, 57; Mich. Pub. Acts 1933, no. 98; Tex. Acts
1934, c. 16.
29. N. C. Laws 1933, c. 275.
30. ILL. Rxv. STAT. A,-NN. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 102, § 19.
31. Ark. Acts 1933, no. 278.
32. Wis. Laws 1933, c. 125, § 269.58.
33. Miss. Laws 1932, c. 251; N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 745, §§ 1, 4, 6; N. J. Pub. Laws 1934,
p. 18.
34. Mich. Pub. Acts 1933, no. 98.
35. Iowa Acts 45th Gen. Assem., c. 179.
36. Tex. Acts 1934, c. 16. Statutes delaying foreclosure for a certain period have been
passed in the following states: Ariz. Laws 1933, c. 29; Cal. Laws 1933, c. 263; Del. let Spec.
Sess. 1933, H. B. no. 5; Ill. Laws 1933, p. 649; Iowa Acts 1933, c. 182; La. Laws 1934,
no. 159; Mich. Pub. Acts 1933, no. 98; Mont. Laws 1933, c. 116; Neb. Lawss 1933, c. 65;
N. H. Laws 1933, c. 161; N. Y. Laws 1933, cc. 793, 794; N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 275 (emergency
period extended); N. C. aws 1933, H. B. 1458, S. B. 135; Ohio Laws 1933, p. 227, H. B.
219; Okla. Laws 1933, c. 16; Pa. Acts 1933, P. L. 827; S. C. Laws 1933, S. B. 1073;
S. D. Laws 1933, c. 135; Tex. Acts 1934, c. 16; Vt. Laws 1933, no. 30; Wis. Laws 1933,
cc. 11, 474. Statutes have likewise been passed which grant to the court the power of
extending the redemption period: Iowa Acts 1933, cc. 179, 182 (redemption period may
be extended for two years); Kan. Laws 1933, c. 232 (period of redemption extended
for six months; governor may extend period for further six months if emergency still
exists) ; Minn. Laws 1933, c. 339 (court may extend redemption period from foreclosure);
S. D. Laws 1933, c. 137.
1935]
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was definitely limited as to time. In a Per Curiam decision, the Michigan court
upheld the constitutionality of the statute and intimated that the Blaisddll Case
has settled the constitutional issue relative to this type of legislation.87  The
Iowa court38 held its statute valid, after citing the major portion of the ma-
jority opinion in the Blaisdell Case. This decision, affirming the decision of
the lower court, was arrived at by an evenly divided court. These two statutes
differed in one respect from the Minnesota statute. While the latter, as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court,30 required that the rental value be applied to
the carrying of the property and the payment of the interest on the mortgage
debt, the Iowa and Michigan statutes allowed the courts, after taxes and
insurance had been paid, to dispose of the balance of the rents in their discre-
tion. This difference prompted the Iowa court to deal extensively with the
rental value provision, finally concluding that the legislature intended that
the courts should apply the rents to the diminution of the mortgage indebted-
ness.40  Furthermore, the court insisted that it was mandatory upon the district
court to distribute the rents so as to compensate the mortgagee. This seems a
striking effort by the court to distort discretion into mandate. The dissenting
opinion in the Iowa decision argued that the contingent nature of the mort-
gagee's right to the rents under this statute constituted a fatal constitutional
objection4 ' in.view of the weight given this provision by the Supreme Court.
37. Russell v. Battle Creek Lumber Co., 265 Mich. 649, 252 N. W. 561 (1934). But
see Virginian Joint Stock Land Bank v. Hudson, 254 N. W. 234, 236 (Mich. 1934) where as
a result of a divided court, the lower court's judgment was affirmed which extended the
period of redemption. The dissenting opinion insisted that the granting of the extension
was within the discretion of the court and since the only equity existing in favor of the
mortgagor was the inadequacy of the foreclosure price, the extension should not be granted.
The opinion pointed out that there was much lay opinion to the effect that all emergency
legislation is constitutional on the strength of the Blaisdell decision, and insisted that this
was obvious error. Cf. Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Wilmarth, 252 N. W. 507 (Iowa
1934). In Young v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 256 N. W. 906 (Minn. 1934) the court
refused to grant the extension after considering the condition of the property mortgaged.
Cf. Town of Cheney's Grove v. VanScoyoc, 351 Ill. 52, 191 N. E. 289 (1934) relative
to the contention of the Michigan court in regard to the constitutionality of emergency
legislation.
38. Des Moines Joint Stock Land Bank v. Nordholm, 253 N. W. 701 (Iowa 1934); cf.
Reed v. Snow, 254 N. W. 800 (Iowa 1934) holding that mortgagor who was hopelessly
insolvent was not entitled to the benefit of the act.
39. Minn. Laws 1933, c. 339, § 4. In interpreting this statute, the United States Supreme
Court held the mortgagee purchaser is not left without compensation for the withholding
of possession since the mortgagor must pay the rental value of the premises which is to be
used for the carrying of the property and the payment of the interest upon the indebtedness.
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, at 446 (1934).
40. Des Moines Joint Stock Land Bank v. Nordholm, 253 N. W. 701 (Iowa 1934).
While this interpretation of the statute eliminates any constitutional objections, the dis-
senting opinion in the decision pointed out that when the legislature provided that the
balance of the rents, after payment of taxes, should be distributed as the court might
direct, it intended that the excess should be returned either to the mortgagor or distributed
equally between the mortgagor and the mortgagee.
41. See Des Moines Joint Stock Land Bank v. Nordholm, 253 N. W. 701, 718 (Iowa
[Vol. 4
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Constitutionality was denied the Texas statute which authorized the court
to stay foreclosure proceedings. This statute, enacted after the Blaisdcll Case,
was modeled on the form of the Minnesota law.P The court refused to over-
rule a previous decision,44 decided before the Blaisddll Case, holding the first
Texas moratorium statute4 5 invalid. Referring to this previous decision, the
court 46 adopted the views therein expressed which stressed the point that the
statute violated the contract clause of the state constitution. T A complete dis-
regard of the Blaisdell Case is evidenced by the fact that it was not cited.
The Maryland Court of Appeals declared unconstitutional"8 two statutes4 9
which deprived the holder or holders of less than twenty-five per cent of the
entire mortgage debt of the right to utilize two summary remedies written into
the contract at its inception. These two remedies provided for an immediate
foreclosure by a trustee and a power of sale on default. Citing the Blaisdell
Case but once,50 and then in support of a proposition taken from a decision t
decided in 1895, the court held that since no other remedy was substituted,
and none of equal coercive force remained, 52 the statute could not be upheld.
While the mortgagee was deprived of two time-saving remedies, he still retained
1934). The dissenting opinion went on the assumption that since the mortgagee vas not
entitled as of right to demand any balance left over after the payment of taxes, he was
not compensated and therefore the statute could not be upheld.
42. Tex. Acts 1934, c. 16.
43. See Jeffers, The Texas Moratorium Law (1934) 12 Ta-. L. Rav. 363, for a discussion
of the moratorium statutes in Texas.
44. Murphy v. Phillips, 63 S. W. (2d) 404 (Tea. Civ. App. 1933). Contra: Lingo
Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 64 S. W. (2d) 835 (Tea. Civ. App. 1933); Beaumont Petroleum
Syndicate v. Broussard, 64 S. W. (2d) 993 (Teax. Civ. App. 1933); cee Plainview Building
& Loan Ass'n v. Robbins, 73 S. W. (2d) 92, 93 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1934) where a concurring
opinion referring to the statute which had since expired, indicated that it believed the
statute was unconstitutional.
45. Tex. Acts 1933, c. 102.
46. Blagg v. Harrigan, 74 S. W. (2d) 324 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934). The lower courts
of Texas are in complete disagreement regarding the constitutionality of the statute
Constitutionality upheld: Williams v. Holmes, 74 S. W. (2d) 1040 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 74 S. W. (2d) 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
47. Tax. CoNSsT. art. I, § 16.
48. United States Mortgage Co. v. Matthews, 173 Atl. 903 (Did. 1934).
49. Md. Acts Spec. Sess. 1933, cc. 56, 57.
50. See United States Mortgage Co. v. Matthews, 173 Atl. 903, 907 (Aid. 1934).
51. New Orleans & L. R. Co. v. Louisiana, 157 U. S. 219 (1895) holding that modes
of procedure are so far within the control of the state that a remedy existing at the inception
of the contract may be abrogated without impairing the obligation provided another remedy
is substituted.
52. The power of a state to interfere with a remedy provided another is substituted,
or one of equal coercive force remains, is well settled. Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S.
769 (1882); McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662 (1890); Canadian Northern Rv.
Co. v. Eggen, 252 U. S. 553 (1920); Conley v. Barton, 260 U. S. 677 (1923). The
Minnesota statute substituted no new remedy to enforce the obligation although it provided
for the payment of the rental value which was to be applied to the carrying of the
property and the payment of the mortgage indebtedness.
1935]
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the remedies of strict foreclosure, foreclosure by formal proceedings and sale
under a breach of condition or happening of a future event.53 The retention
of these remedies, the necessity of preventing a speedy method of foreclosing
during a severe depression,5 4 and the requirement that at least seventy-six
per cent of the holders of the remaining interest refrain from taking advantage
of the summary remedies, suggest grounds for supporting the reasonableness of
the statute. However, in view of the conservative interpretation of the Blaisdcll
decision by the court, 5 the question appears to be, not whether a statute which
stays a remedy is reasonable in its application, but whether another remedy has
been substituted for the one taken away.
Another familiar type of mortgage emergency legislation grants to the courts
the power to refuse confirmation of a foreclosure sale because of the inadequacy
of the price.56  This form of legislation was declared constitutional by the
53. See United States Mortgage Co. v. Matthews, 173 At. 903, 907 (1934). The court
outlined the five modes of procedure available to the mortgagee on the default of the
mortgagor. In designating the reason for which the statute could not be upheld, the court
indicated that the mortgagee must now be compelled to obtain the consent of those,
including his own interest, whose combined interest would then amount to twenty-five
per cent of the debt. The mortgage contract contained an a-sent to foreclosure proceedings
pursuant to the summary remedies provided by the statutes and likewise the words "or
any amendment or additions thereto." The court held that this part of the contract
referred only to those additions made prior to the execution of the contract and therefore
the emergency statute, although an addition to the statute, was not a provision of the
contract. The interpretation of the court is weakened when it is considered that there
had been no additions to the statute prior to the execution of the mortgage and therefore
the parties must have contemplated any additions made subsequent thereto.
54. Md. Acts 1933, cc. 56, 57. The preamble to the act recited the existence of an
emergency and the necessity for delaying foreclosures during such a period. Since the
statute denied the remedy to the holders whose combined interest did not amount to
twenty-five per cent of the entire debt, it would require seventy-six per cent of the holders
of the remaining interest to refrain from consenting to foreclose.
55. In harmony with the interpretation of the Blaisdell case by the court is the state-
ment that if "the law under consideration is unconstitutional in the absence of an
emergency, in our opinion it cannot be held to be constitutional because of any fancied or
real emergency, but its constitutionality must be tested in the same way as if it had been
passed in the times of economic prosperity." See United States Mortgage Co. v. Matthews,
173 AtI. 903, 909 (Md. 1934). But see Hanauer v. Republic Bldg. Co., 295 N. W. 136,
139 (Wis. 1934) ("To say that an emergency creates the occasion for greater exercise of
the police power with respect to contracts, is merely to state that a greater degree of
impairment is permissible when the pressure of the social need is great"). See U. S. L. Week,
Dec. 4, 1934, at 28, wherein the United States Supreme Court reversed the Maryland
court's decision in United States Mortgage Co. v. Matthews, 173 Atl. 903 (Md. 1934). The
Supreme Court's reversal was predicated on the existence in the contract of the words
that the mortgagor consented to have the property foreclosed pursuant to the statute
and "any amendments or additions thereto," holding that such words were sufficient to
embrace not only amendments or additions made prior to the execution of the mortgage
but also amendments and additions made thereafter. The emergency statute in Maryland,
therefore, constituted an addition to the foreclosure statute as intended by the parties.
56. Procedure for refusing to confirm unless the foreclosure price is adequate and the
[Vol. 4
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North Carolina Supreme Court.57 The question of the reasonableness of the
price was left to the court, there being no suggestion of extra judicial appraise-
ment. Significant is the fact that the statute contains no recital of an emer-
gency and is apparently permanent legislation. The court merely indicated
that it thought the statute constitutional58 in view of the Blaisdell Case. A
fatal defect in this statute might be the failure of the legislature to indicate
that it was emergency legislation. Even if it were construed to be such, how-
ever, the absence of any time limit in the statute might prove to be a vul-
nerable spot in view of Worthen Co. v. Tlzonzs. 9 In this case the United
States Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statute, which was sought to be
sustained as an emergency measure, because it lacked a time limit and was
not restricted by conditions reasonably appropriate to the emergency.
granting to the courts the power to fix an upset price have been provided for by
statutes in the following states: Ariz. Laws 1933, c. 88 (upset price); Ark. Laws 1933,
no. 21 (in confirming sale, court is to consider condition of debtor, economic conditions
and fair price of property); Cal. Laws 1933, c. 793 (deficiency after foreclosure limited to
amount by which debt exceeds fair market value of property); Idaho Laws 1933,
c. 150 (deficiency judgment in excess of debt and reasonable value of property forbidden);
Kan. Laws 1933, c. 218 (court may refuse to confirm if price inadequate); La. Laws
1934, no. 28 (deficiency judgment abolished unless there be appraisement of property);
lich. Acts 1933, no 229 (upset price); Miss. Laws 1934, H. B. 270 (upset price); N. J.
Laws 1933, c. 82 (mortgagor may raise issue of fair market price); N. C. Laws 1933, c.
275 (procedure for fixing fair value); N. D. Laws 1933, c. 155 (courts may not grant
deficiency judgments); Pa. Acts 1933, P. L. 827 (courts vested with power to stay in-
equitable foreclosures); Pa. Acts 1933, no. 59 (procedure for determining fair value of
foreclosed property) ; S. C. Laws 1933, S. B. 174 (appraisal of property in fixing deficiency
judgments) ; Wis. Laws 1933, c. 13 (upset price).
57. N. C. Laws 1933, c. 275; Hopkins v. Swain, 206 N. C. 439, 174 S. E. 409 (1934).
Contra: Adams v. Spillyards, 187 Ark. 641, 61 S. W. (2d) 686 (1933); Vanderbilt v. Bran-
ton Piano Co., 111 N. J. L. 596, 169 AUt. 177 (1933), cited note 15, supra. In Gantly's Lesee
v. Ewing, 44 U. S. 707 (1845) a statute was held unconstitutional in its application to
prior existing mortgages which provided that no real property could be sold on execution
at less than one-half its appraised value. The present decision seems contra to this case.
Cf. Farmers & Mechanics Bank v. Eagle Building Co., 151 Misc. 249, 271 N. Y. Supp.
306 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (court has inherent equity power to fa' an upset price); see Suring
State Bank v. Giese, 210 Wis. 489, 492-493, 246 N. W. 556, 557-558 (1933) (equity court
has inherent jurisdiction to fix upset price and to refuse to confirm because of inadequacy
of price); Ballentyne v. Smith, 205 U. S. 285, 290 (1907) (a sale will not be set
aside for mere inadequacy of price, unless so gross as to shock the conscience of the court).
But in Kenly v. Huntingdon Building Ass'n, 170 AUt. 526 (Did. 1934) the court insisted
that equity has no power to set aside a sale for mere inadequacy of price. See cases cited
note 17, supra.
58. Hopkins v. Swain, 206 N. C. 439, 174 S. E. 409 (1934). There was no attempt to
discuss the question of whether it was an emergency statute or was limited in time. CI.
Shouse v. Quinley, 37 P. (2d) 89 (Cal. 1934) (statute not valid as emergency measure
in absence of declared legislative intent to that effect and lack of a time limit).
59. 292 U. S. 426 (1934). One of the reasons for holding the Arkansas emergency
insurance statute unconstitutional was that it was not definitely limited as to time.
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The Wisconsin statute,60 in denying a bondholder the power to sue on the
bond until the trustee foreclosed on the mortgage, placed an unsecured creditor
in a more advantageous position than one secured; for while there was no
limitation on the power of an ordinary unsecured creditor to sue, the secured
creditor's remedy was expressly denied. In holding the statute unconstitu-
tional, the Wisconsin court maintained that it did not satisfy the criteria of
reasonableness established in the Blaisdell Case, since it was not limited in time
and did not compensate the bondholder for the denial of his remedy.0 1 The
court indicated, in its discussion of the Blaisdell Case, that the decision upheld
the power of a state to impair the obligation of contracts in a time of emer-
gency.6 2 Nowhere in the majority opinion of the Blaisdell Case is the admis-
sion made that the Minnesota statute impaired the obligation of the contract.0 3
A statute, 4 providing for a general modification of remedies in favor of
property owners delinquent in the payment of assessments, was declared consti-
tutional by the Arkansas court.65 The district making the assessments had
issued bonds to mature as the assessments became due, and the present statute
affected the districts' and the bondholders' contracts. The majority opinion
60. Wis. Laws 1933, c. 125, § 269.58.
61. Hanauer v. Republic Building Co., 255 N. W. 136 (Wis. 1934); cf. Weisel v.
Hagdahl Realty Co., 241 App. Div. 314, 271 N. Y. Supp. 629 (2d Dep't 1934). The court
in this case refused to follow the statute where it tended to deprive the junior mortgagee
of all his rights against the mortgagor. In Harris v. Monroe Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 14
So. 503 (La. 1934) the court cited verbatim the latter part of the Blaisdell decision In
holding unconstitutional a statute which attempted to deprive withdrawing stockholders
of a loan association of dividends to which they were entitled by virtue of a previous
statute.
62. See Hanauer v. Republic Building Co., 255 N. W. 136, 138 (Wis. 1934).
63. This is significant since the Minnesota Supreme Court admitted that the statute
impaired the obligation of contracts. See Blaisdell v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 189
Minn. 422, 425, 249 N.,W. 334, 335 (1933).
64. Ark. Acts 1933, no. 278. The act gave property owners within the district ninety
days in which to make payments of past due assessment, it formerly being thirty days;
reduced payment of penalty for non-payment from twenty per cent to three per cent;
six months to answer complaint instead of the former five days; gave owner twelve
months in which to pay judgment instead of ten days. While the act is not of the usual
mortgage variety, the methods of enforcing the obligations are similar.
65. Sewer Improvement Dist. v. Delinquent Lands, 188 Ark. 738, 68 S. W. (2d) 80
(1934). This decision was followed in Harris v. Little Red River Levee, 188 Ark. 975,
69 S. W. (2d) 877 (1934) and Worthen Co. v. Delinquent Lands, 75 S. W. (2d) 62 (Ark.
1934); cf. Moore v. Gas Securities Co., 278 Fed. 111 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921) (modification of
remedies in favor of delinquents, impairment of bondholders obligation); Chapman v.
Jocelyn, 182 Cal. 294, 187 Pac. 962 (1920) (street assessment is a contract, and bonds
issued on such cannot be affected by subsequent legislation affecting the requirement of sale) ;
Indianapolis v. Robison, 186 Ind. 660, 117 N. E. 861 (1917) (change of remedy affecting
enforcement of assessments for street improvement unconstitutional). In the decision of
Islais Co. v. Matheson, 35 P. (2d) 1051 (Cal. 1934) the court denied the bondholders tie
right to question the constitutionality of a statute which reduced the penalty for
delinquency in the payment of assessments. See Comment (1934) 43 YAL. L. J. 941,
n. 112 for a list of statutes relative to the reduction of penalties.
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relied on the Blaisdell Case and indicated that, as the result of this decision,
a statute which is directed at the remedies on a contract does not violate the
contract clause. While an emergency measure, the statute contained no time
limit and no provision is made relative to the payment of the rental value
during the extended period.66 Considering these factors and the practical argu-
ment that this legislation would encourage delinquency, the statute does not
appear to be reasonably appropriate to the emergency and seems objectionable
in that it results in a substantial impairment of the contract.0 7
Emergency Legislation on Collateral Matters
As the statutes leave the usual type of mortgage legislation, their position
becomes precarious and more susceptible to constitutional attacks. Since the
Supreme Court stressed the point that the Minnesota statute dealt with mort-
gages and gave adequate protection to the mortgagee during the extended
period,' 8 statutes which deal with other transactions must make some provision
for securing the creditor so that his rights will not be prejudiced during this
period. The decisions, subsequently discussed, deal with statutes which are
not of the usual mortgage variety.G9 A noticeable feature of the cases which
have upheld these statutes, is the fact that the majority of the courts refer,
with ostensible willingness but obvious brevity, to the Blaisdcll Case as indi-
cating that a state may pass emergency legislation during a period of economic
stress.70
As a result of the frequent bank closings in 1932, it was unusually difficult
in Illinois to secure individuals to act as sureties on the bond of a custodian
of public funds as required by law. To remedy this situation, the Illinois legis-
66. See Sewer Improvement Dist. v. Delinquent Lands, 68 S. W. (2d) 80, 87 (Ark.
1934). The dissenting opinion relied on this factor in arguing against the constitutionality
of the statute. A practical objection to such a statute might be the suggestion that it
would tend to encourage delinquency. Cf. State ex rel. Murphy v. Cherry, 67 S. W. (2d)
1024 (Ark. 1934) (statute allowing landowners to pay assesment with overdue bonds,
unconstitutional). Accord: Shouse v. Quinley, 37 P. (2d) S9 (Cal. 1934); In re Cranberry
Creek Drainage District, 202 Wis. 64, 231 N. W. 58S (1934).
67. Cf. Green v. Biddle, 21 U. S. 1 (1823); Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U. S. 203
(1880) (the remedy subsisting in a state at time contract is made is part of the obligation).
While the Blaisdell decision has placed a qualification on the theory that a remedy
cannot be interfered with without impairing the obligation, the qualification has its
limitations. Cf. Bradley v. Lightcap, 195 U. S. 1 (1904); Bank of Minden v. Clement,
256 U. S. 126 (1921), where it was held that the remedy was so interfered with as to
constitute an impairment of the obligation.
68. The majority opinion stressed the factor that the procedure of granting a period
of redemption was cognate of the historic exercise of equity jurisdiction. In comparing
the relief granted by the statute to the equitable remedy, the necessary implication is
that since the mortgagee remains secured and he wil, eventually, either recover the debt,
or have the property sold to satisfy the indebtedness, the statute has not done violence
to the original nature of the transaction. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. BlaLdell, 290
U. S. 398 (1934)..
69. See cases cited notes 71, 81, 85, 86, infra.
70. See cases cited note 103, infra.
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lature enacted a group of statutes,7 1 one of which delayed suit against any
custodian who had deposited the funds in a bank which was already closed
or closed subsequent to the enactment of the statute.72  The act likewise
effectively relieved the sureties on the custodian's bond from suit. The
creditor was denied his remedy for a period not to extend beyond two years
after such closing, and the custodian was to pay over to such creditor whatever
funds he received from the closed bank during the extended period. Suit was
brought against the custodian and the sureties, and the court refused to sustain
the action.73 In upholding the statute, the court 74 indicated that it was con-
stitutionally bound to follow the Blaisdell Case. The court pointed out that
the statute was merely directed toward the enforcement of the contract, and was
not an unconditional extension since the sureties must consent to the stay and
the right to sue is not postponed for a definite period of two years but only
until the custodian had received funds from the closed bank. The court
stated that its views were in harmony with the holdings in the Blaisdell decision.
A reasonable inference from the opinion is that the court believed that the
Blaisdell decision settled the constitutional issue relative to moratory legisla-
tion in general.
Peculiar to the present depression has been legislation which attempts to
aid the reorganization of closed banks75 and the liquidation of defaulting mort-
gage guarantee companies. 76 In the bank situation, the usual method of
71. See Town of Cheney's Grove v. VanScoyoc, "357 Ill. 52, 191 N. E. 289, 291 (1934).
There were upwards of fifty laws enacted at the special session of the legislature to meet
conditions resulting from the closing of banks in Illinois. The present statute, however,
was not designated emergency legislation. The emergency feature was supplied to this
act by the court by reference over to a companion statute which recited the existence of
the emergency.
72. ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 102, § 19.
73. Town of Cheney's Grove v. VanScoyoc, 357 11. 52, 191 N. E. 289 (1934). The court
held that the relief granted was conditional since the treasurer would be bound to turn
over whatever proceeds he did receive from the closed bank to the payment of the debt and
furthermore before the relief could be granted, the sureties must consent to such stay and
must waive and release all liability on account of such extension. By virtue of these
provisions of the statute, the court held that the statute did not provide an unconditional
extension and therefore furnished as much justification as any other case it had examined,
for holding that a subsequent stay law does not constitute an impairment of the contract.
74. Town of Cheney's Grove v. VanScoyoc, 357 Ill. 52, 191 N. E. 289 (1934). Although
it was stated by the court that their views were in harmony with the majority opinion
in the Blaisdell decision, the dissimilarity of the act to that of the Minnesota statute
suggests the belief that in Illinois all moratoria are constitutional in view of the decision.
But see Virginian joint Stock Land Bank v. Hudson, 254 N. W. 234, 236 (Mich. 1934)
("contrary to much lay opinion, the Blaisdell decision does not purport to set aside the
Constitution and validate all sorts of legislation because it is given an emergency label").
75. See Legis. (1934) 34 COL. L. REV. 152. This recent legislation is comprehensively
discussed and a list of statutes providing for reorganization is set out in n. 14.
76. See note 85, infra. See Comment (1934) 43 YALE: L. J. 1146, for a discussion of this.
type of legislation and its application to a specific case.
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liquidation would result in a further contraction of credit,7 7 and in the mort-
gage company set-up it would not be desirable since forced sales of realty would
increase the seriousness of an already acute real estate market 7 Furthermore,
in this mortgage company situation, the adjustment of the rights of certificate
holders which are secured by a fractional interest in a bond and mortgage
or a group of bonds and mortgages, has created an intricate and perpleing
problem.7 9
A plan of reorganization, presented by the general creditors and depositors
of a closed bank pursuant to an emergency statute, 0 was sustained by the Mis-
sissipi court.8 ' The statute provided that any plan that had the agreement
of seventy-five per cent of the general depositors and creditors and bad been
approved of by the superintendent of banks, should be binding upon non-
assenters. In the present case, one of the stipulations of the plan was the
release of the liability of those old stockholders who would pay in fifty per
cent of their old stock and up to a collective amount of $55,000 in new money.
The statute made no provision for such a release but the court maintained
that it was a necessary implication. While there are decisions which uphold
this type of statute providing that the non-assenters may be bound by the
majority creditors,82 the objection to the release provision presents a more
77. See Legis., supra note 75.
78. See N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 745 § 1. This section sets out the fact and policy of the
act. It recites in part that under "existing conditions any immediate liquidation of any
substantial amount of such bonds, mortgages or other security in respect to which such
default exists, or the attempt to do so, would so demoralize the general real estate market
that there might be realized on such bonds, mortgages or other security substantially less
than the face amount thereof and substantially less than would be realized if they were
disposed of in an orderly manner and over a reasonable period of time."
79. The liquidation of these companies has created a sui generis situation for it has
become imperative to determine the exact legal relationship existing between the mortgage
company and the certificate holders. See Note (1934) 34 Con. L. REv. 663, 675.
80. Miss. Laws 1932, c. 251.
81. Dunn v. Love, 155 So. 331 (Miss. 1934). See Legis. (1934) 34 CoL. L. REv. 1395,
dealing with the question of legal devices for the rehabilitation of banks. Cf. 48 STr. 72,
12 U. S. C. A. § 207 (1933).
82. McConville v. Ft. Pierce Bank & Trust Co., 101 Fla. 727, 135 So. 392 (1931);
Mlner v. Gibson, 249 Ky. 594, 61 S. W. (2d) 273 (1933); Sweeny v. Jefferson County
Bank's Reorganization Committee, 250 Ky. 187, 61 S. W. (2d) 1090 (1933); Nagel v.
Ghingher, 171 At. 65 (Md. 1934); Timmons v. People's Trust Co., 173 S. E. 79 (W. Va.
1934). But there are numerous decisions to the effect that the majority may only bind
those non-assenters who have become depositors after the act was enacted. Hoff v. First
State Bank, 174 Minn. 36, 218 N. W. 238 (1928); Hagen v. First State Bank, 180 firi.
113, 230 N. W. 267 (1930) ; Engelcke v. Farmers State Bank, 246 N. W. 283 (S. D. 1932) ;
In re Farmers Exchange Bank, 55 S. D. 190, 225 N. W. 307 (1929); Farmers & Merchants
Bank v. Tomlinson, 55 S. D. 185, 225 N. W. 305 (1929); Wus~au Malt Products Co. v.
Citizens State Bank, 254 N. W. 379 (Wis. 1934). Some of the decisions have advanced
the "affected with a public interest" argument, in sustaining the statutes. McConvile v.
Ft. Pierce Bank & Trust Co., 101 Fla. 727, 135 So. 392 (1931) (banks of a quasi-public
nature subject to regulation); Milner v. Gibson, 249 Ky. 594, 61 S. W. (2d) 273 (1933)
(contracts must yield to public welfare); Wassau Malt Products Co. v. Citizens State
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serious problem. There are recent decisions83 which insist that non-assenters
cannot be bound by this provision of a plan, and in using the Blaisdcll Case
to hurdle this obstacle, the Mississippi court indicated that the decision au-
thorized this exercise of the police power in a time of emergency. It is apparent
that the Mississippi court has given the Blaisdell decision a very broad inter-
pretation in sustaining the statute and the reorganization plan.
Certain provisions of statutes8 4 dealing with the mortgage company situation
were upheld by the New Jersey8 5 and New York courts.80 In the New Jersey
case, the court approved of a plan of liquidation which was to be carried out
by trustees appointed by the court after nominations had been received from
the creditors' committees. The plan provided that non-assenting creditors,
along with the assenters, were to receive certificates in an association similar
to a Massachusetts Trust. These certificates were to be redeemed when the
assets of the company were sufficiently liquidated.87 The binding of the non-
assenters, and the obviating of the necessity for paying them in cash) were
pursuant to the emergency statute.8s Faced with a contrary precedent88 and
Bank, 254 N. W. 379 (Wis. 1934) (subject to be regulated for protection of public). In
Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104 (1911) it was held that banks are affected with
a public interest. See Legis. (1934) 34 CoL. L. REv. 153, n. 14, for a collection of statutes
relative to the reopening of closed banks.
83. Hessen Siak Shams v. Neb. State Bank, 48 F. (2d) 894 (D. C. Neb. 1931);
Sneve v. Hagen, 250 N. W. 26 (S. D. 1933); Bush v. Lien, 57 S. D. 501, 234 N. W. 29
(1930); cf. Hagen v. First State Bank, 180 Minn. 113, 230 N. W. 267 (1930) (release
binding on creditors who became such after statute enacted).
84. N. J. Pub. Laws 1934, p. 18; N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 745 §§ 1, 4, 6, c. 780; see N. Y.
Laws 1934, c. 909 amending c. 745 so as to provide for a definite time limit. See also
N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 906.
85. Kipp v. Fidelity Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co., 174 At 229 (N. J. Ch. 1934).
86. Matter of People (Title & Mortgage Guaranty Company of Buffalo), 264 N. Y. 69,
190 N. E. 153 (1934).
87. Kipp v. Fidelity Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co., 174 AtI. 229 (N. J. Ch. 1934). A
receiver had been appointed by the court who had carried on a process of liquidation for
two years. The creditors desired to take the company out of the control of the receiver
and place it in the hands of trustees who were to be appointed by the court. As pre-
sented, the plan provided that the secured and unsecured creditors be treated alike, but
the court refused to sustain this provision of the plan because it believed that It was not
necessary to its success. Since the assets were not sufficient to satisfy creditors in full,
the consent of the stockholders to the plan was not necessary. This was pursuant to a
provision of the emergency statute. As finally approved of by the court, the plan pro-
vided that the trustees be named by the court after nominations by the creditors' com-
mittees. Secured certificate holders were to receive at their option either special certificates,
which would entitle them to an undivided ownership in the mortgages of their group, and
no more, or general certificates which would entitle the holders to a beneficial interest
in the unpledged assets. Before the plan would be approved of by the court, two-thirds
of the holders of each series of mortgage certificates and two-thirds of the general
creditors must consent.
88. N. J. Pub. Laws 1934, p. 18.
89. Moore v. Splitdorf Electrical Co., 114 N. J. Eq. 358, 168 AtI. 741 (1933). This case
held that in the absence of statute, minority non-assenting creditors cannot be compelled
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any analogies that may be drawn to the decisionsP0 in the general reorganization
field, holding that dissenters cannot be compelled to take shares in a new
company, the court nevertheless sustained the statute and used the Blaisdell
decision to neutralize the effect of these decisions and the constitutional objec-
tion of impairment of contracts. While the Blaisdell decision is entering strange
fields in sustaining the exercise of the police power, the statute in the instant
case appears to be a reasonable exercise of the power. The secured creditors
are not deprived of their security, and the plan is a feasible alternative to
ordinary receivership proceedings.l
The New York Court of Appeals declared certain provisions 2 of the much
discussed Schackno Act 93 constitutional.0 4 The power of the Superintendent of
Insurance, granted to him by virtue of the New York Insurance Law3 and the
Schackno Act, to assume control of the collateral placed with the depositary
to accept shares in a new corporation in lieu of cash. In the Kipp v. Fidelity Title &
Mortgage Guaranty Co., 174 Atl. 229 (N. J. Ch. 1934), many of the creditors were such
before the passage of the act and therefore it would be subject to attack by them on the
theory that it impaired existing contracts.
90. Coriell v. Morris White Inc., 54 F. (2d) 255 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) holding that
minority creditors could not be compelled to take securities and stock in a new company
in lieu of cash, rev'd on other grounds in National Surety Co. v. Coriell, 289 U. S. 426
(1933). See Moore v. Splitdorf Electrical Co., 114 N. 3. Eq. 358, 364, 168 At!. 741, 744
(1933) for a discussion of the circuit court's decision and cases sustaining such decision.
In the railroad reorganization field, there is divided opinion concerning whether minority
creditors can be compelled to accept shares in a new company. This conflict is predicated
on a dictum in the much discussed case of Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U. S.
482, 508 (1913), wherein the court stated that the minority creditors may be compelled
to take stock in lieu of cash. See Swaine, Reorganiation-the Next Step: A Reply to
Mr. James N. Rosenberg (1922) 22 CoL L. Rzv. 121, to the effect that an equity court
has no power to force a plan of reorganization on unwilling creditors. To the opposite
effect, see Rosenberg, A New Scheme of Reorganization (1922) 22 CoL. L. REv. 14. See
as to the fairness of a plan, Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Central Union Trust Co.,
28 F. (2d) 177 (C. C. A. Sth, 1928).
91. See Kipp v. Fidelity Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co., 174 At. 229, 231 (N. J. Ch.
1934). The court indicated that the present plan would be more dedrable than the
usual administration by a receiver since "receivers do the safe routine things, but seldom
do they attempt to scour the land for customers and lay awake nights devising ways to
make a deal."
92. N.Y. Laws 1933, c. 745, §§ 1, 4, 6; c. 780.
93. See Comment (1934) 34 CoL. L. R v. 663 for a discussion of the act.
94. Matter of People (Title & Mortgage Guaranty Company of Buffalo), 264 N. Y.
69, 190 N. B. 153 (1934); see U. S. L. Week, Nov. 20, 1934, at 11, for the United States
Supreme Court decision dismissing the appeal from the New York State court's judgment
for want of a substantial federal question. Since the motion for injunction was made
prior to the promulgation of a plan by the superintendent, constitutional objections were
a matter of conjecture.
95. ART. XI. By virtue of this law the superintendent became a statutory receiver.
But it makes no reference relative to an express power to administer the investments of the
companies. This power was assumed by virtue of the Schackno Act.
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by the guaranty company to secure the certificate holders, was upheld.00 It
was indicated by the court that a debtor secured-creditor relationship existed
between the guaranty company and the certificate holders.97 Although there
is precedent to the effect that a secured creditor is entitled to realize on the
pledged property even when a receiver has been appointed, 98 the necessity of
delaying wholesale foreclosures warrants the interference with the usual remedy
of such creditors. Also, since receivership proceedings would be necessary
to properly liquidate the interests of the certificate holders in the mortgages,
the appointment of the superintendent seems a reasonable substitution. The
court, while it placed great reliance on the broad principles90 of the Blaisdelt
Case, indicated that such legislative action need not find justification in the
nature of an economic emergency.10°
It is clear that the courts have not been consistent in their interpretations of
the Blaisdell Case. The decisions are divided into those which hold it to be
reassertive of recognized law, 0l1 those which admit it to be an advance but
96. Attempts have been made by the certificate holders to withdraw control from
the superintendent. Kline v. 275 Madison Ave. Corp., 149 Misc. 747, 268 N. Y. Supp.
582 (Sup. Ct. 1934); People ex rel. Van Schaick v. N. Y. Title & Mortgage Co., 150 Misc.
89, 269 N. Y. Supp. 83 (Sup. Ct. 1934); Nemerov v. N. Y. Title & Mortgage Co., 149 Misc.
797, 268 N. Y. Supp. 588 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
97. Matter of People (Title & Mortgage Guaranty Company of Buffalo), 264 N. Y. 69,
88, 190 N. E. 153, 159 (1934) ("but we construe the contract in accordance with its
substance and effect. So construed, the guaranty company is a primary debtor, assigning
the mortgages only as collateral security for the debt").
98. Matter of Directors of Binghamton General Electric Co., 143 N. Y. 261, 38 N. E.
297 (1894).
99. Judge Lehman, writing the opinion, frankly confessed, in reference to the Inter-
ference with the remedies of the certificate holders, "To that extent it (the statute) has
impaired the obligation of contract," and then proceeded with a discussion of the Blalsdell
decision. Referring to Chief Justice Hughes' comments upon the flexibility of the contract
clause when the pressure exerted by the vital interests of the people demanded it, and the
reference to the enforcement of contracts as presupposing the maintenance of a govern-
ment by which they are made worthwhile, he states: "Authority may establish the
criteria to be applied in the ever changing conditions of a complex economic civilization."
Relying on the rationale of the decision with the implications that may be drawn there-
from, the New York court has apparently proceeded a step beyond the Blaisdell decision.
Matter of People (Title & Mortgage Guaranty Company of Buffalo), 264 N. Y. 69, 82-83,
191 N. E. 153, 157 (1934). In Klinke v. Samuels, 264 N. Y. 144, 190 N. E. 324 (1934) tie
New York Court of Appeals relied on the above decision in sustaining c. 794, N. Y. Laws
1933, which granted the courts the power of fixing the fair value of the property where
the mortgagee seeks a deficiency judgment. In this decision the guarantor of the mortgage
debt invoked the benefit of the act.
100. See Matter of People (Title & Mortgage Guaranty Company of Buffalo), 264
N. Y. 69, 94, 191 N. E. 153, 161 (1934).
101. Blagg v. Harrigan, 74 S. W. (2d) 324 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934). In this decision
the court did not cite the Blaisdell decision in denying constitutionality to the Texas
mortgage moratorium act, indicating that it had no effect in the determination of the
question before the court. In United States Mortgage Co. v. Matthews, 173 Ati. 903
(Md. 1934) the court cited the Blaisdell Case along with other decisions for a proposi-
tion taken from a decision decided in 1895. See notes 50, 51, 52, supra.
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to be limited to its facts, 10 2 and those which find the broad principles of the
decision suggestive enough to warrant a wider use of the reserved power of
the state' 03  If one trend is to be noted which stands out in this clash of the
decisions of the state courts, it is that the Blaisdell Case is being seized upon
to justify emergency legislation not alone in the field of mortgages but in other
branches of the law as well.
SuRvIVAL AND REvIvAL OF PEPsoNAL INJURY ACTIONS IN THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS.-Modern opinion having rejected the ancient notion of tort liability
as a punitive rather than a compensatory measure,' the outworn rule of the
common law that personal actions2 die with the persona has gradually yielded
to the attacks of a more realistic jurisprudence. 4 While the category of sur-
102. Des Moines Joint Stock Land Bank v. Nordholm, 253 N. W. 701 (Iowa 1934).
The attempt by this court to construe the Iowa statute so that it satisfied the require-
ments set out in the Blaisdell decision is indicative of the belief of this court that the
criteria of reasonableness must be satisfied before the statute can be upheld. While the
Wisconsin court in Hanauer v. Republic Bldg. Co., 255 N. W. 136 (Wis. 1934) used some
very broad language in interpreting the Blaisdell decision, the court held the statute
unconstitutional since it did not satisfy the criteria of reasonableness established by the
decision. See note 19, supra.
103. Sewer Improvement Dist. v. Delinquent Lands, 188 Ark. 738, 68 S. W. (2d) 80
(1934) (Blaisdell decision used to sustain a general change of remedies); Town of
Cheney's Grove v. VanScoyoc, 357 Ill. 52, 191 N. E. 289 (1934) (constitutionally bound
to follow Blaisdell decision although statute not of usual mortgage moratoria); Dunn
v. Love, 155 So. 331 (Miss. 1934) (Blaisdell decision used to uphold release of part of
the liability of bank stockholders); Matter of People (Title & Mortgage Guaranty Com-
pany of Buffalo), 264 N. Y. 69, 190 N. E. 153 (1934) (Blaisdell decision relied on to
sustain the power of superintendent to administer affairs of mortgage company).
1. Por ocx:, LAW oF ToRTS (12th ed. 1923) 578.
2. A right of action is of a personal nature if it is based upon an injury done to either
person or property for which the remedy is in damages. 3 BL. CoMxa. *117.
3. 3 BL. Co=am. *302; Hegerich v. Keddie, 99 N. Y. 258, 1 N. E. 787 (1885); United
States Casualty Co. v. Rice, 18 S. W. (2d) 760 (Tex. 1929). Under this doctrine the
personal representatives of a deceased tort-feasor could not, as a general rule, be held
responsible for torts of the decedent. Matter of Killough's Estate, 148 Misc. 73, 265 N. Y.
Supp. 301 (Surr. Ct. 1933). Pain and bodily injuries were not regarded as possessed
of such transmissible qualities as to fix upon the living liability to atone for injuries
inflicted or suffered by the dead. Best v. Vedder, 58 How. Pr. 187 (N. Y. 1879).
Where, however, a direct result of the tortious conduct was the enrichment of the estate
of the wrong-doer, a recovery could be had. Osborn v. Bell, S Denio 370 (N. Y. 1848);
Hambly v. Trott, 1 Cowp. 371, 98 Eng. Reprints 1136 (1776).
4. See Winfield, Death as Affecting Liability in Tort (1929) 29 CoL. L. REv. 239. The
explanation for the persistent denial of redress in tort at common law againt the rep-
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